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The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce
I. Introduction
Courts are entrusted with few decisions as sensitive as those involving
child custody disputes.I In these disputes courts must separate the members of
disintegrating families into arrangements which best serve the interests of the
children. The problem is compounded when the parents disagree on their
children's religious upbringing. To protect children from the harmful effects
which might result from exposure to contradictory religious traditions, courts
occasionally issue orders regarding religious upbringing which stretch the first
amendment to its limits.
This note will examine the constitutionality of judicial intervention in the
religious upbringing of children after divorce.2 It will outline principles
supporting the custodial parent's authority over her children's religious up-
bringing and safeguarding the non-custodial parent's interest in com-
municating religious values to his children during periods of visitation.3 Final-
ly, this note will discuss the degree to which children are entitled to choose a
religion (or no religion) despite the courts' power to place that choice in the
hands of one or both of the separated parents.
II. The Constitutional Problem
In Massachusetts, a mother with custody of the children objected to her
ex-husband's practice of reading the Bible to their children during his visitation
period.4 She believed her ex-husband's actions confused the children and
undermined her ability to control their religious training. The mother suc-
cessfully petitioned the Hampden County Probate Court to modify its earlier
order and prohibit the father from reading the Bible to the children during his
visits with them.5 Thus, the first amendment rights of the custodial parent
prevailed over those of the non-custodial parent.
However, in Wagner v. Wagner, 6 a New Jersey father had been granted
visitation rights commencing each Friday evening on all weekends during
which his children were not scheduled to attend their religious school. When
the mother enrolled the children in a school requiring attendance every Satur-
day, the father sought to modify the court's order to require the mother to
reduce the amount of religious education she was providing for the children.
1 See generally, Watson, Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV.
55 (1969).
2 The applicability of various provisions in state constitutions is beyond the scope of this note.
3 For purposes of clarity, the custodial and non-custodial parents will be referred to throughout this
note as if custody had been awarded to the mother. This is the result in 90% of all child custody disputes,
according to modern estimates. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L.
423, 423 (1977).
4 News Notes, 11979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2336 (Feb. 20, 1979).
5 Id.
6 165 N.J. Super. 553, 398 A.2d 918, 921 (App. Div. 1979).
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On appeal, the New Jersey intermediate appellate court remanded the case to
ascertain whether an alternative form of religious instruction was available
which would not infringe so greatly upon the father's visitation periods. 7 The
appellate court urged an accommodation of the conflicting parental interests
even at the expense of the children's spiritual education.8 The court reasoned
that the children benefitted from their father's visits and that any deficiencies in
the children's religious training "may be overcome if the children desire it
when they become more mature. "9
Court orders prohibiting a parent from reading the Bible to his children or
infringing on a parent's choice of religious education for her children appear
repugnant to the first amendment and to the traditional freedom from state in-
tervention enjoyed by the parent-child relationship. Nevertheless, courts find
such intervention permissible where the family unit is dissolved and where the
irreconcilable religious dispute is of such magnitude as to be harmful to the
children's welfare. In cases such as Wagner and the Hampden County Bible-
reading case, 10 however, where the presumed harm to the children is neither
obvious nor imminent, the constitutionality of judicial intervention in the
religious upbringing of children is less clear. A court order such as that issued
in the Hampden County case places the non-custodial parent in the anomalous
position of having a constitutionally protected right to speak on religion to a
passerby on the street,"t but not to his own children. Similarly, a parent sub-
jected to such an order might have less right to provide his children with
religious materials than would a complete stranger.12
One may be tempted to look for ulterior motives behind parents' actions
in post-divorce religious upbringing cases. A custodial parent trying to graft
religious training obligations onto the divorce settlement may simply want to
decrease the non-custodial parent's visitation privileges to the point that they
become meaningless.1 3 Undoubtedly, religious training can be used as a
weapon by a vengeful former spouse to carry on a battle which should have
ended with the divorce. The children can become, as one judge stated, "foot-
balls to satisfy the 'I'll show you' attitudes with which estranged spouses too
frequently are imbued." ' 14
Nevertheless, the religious upbringing of children after divorce can be a
source of genuine disagreement when one or both of the parents are firm
adherents to discordant creeds. Such disagreements often begin when one
parent becomes more fervent in his belief or converts to a different faith. The
7 Id. at 557, 398 A.2d at 921.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See note 4 supra and text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
11 The activities of street evangelists are generally protected by the first amendment guarantees of
religious liberty and freedom of speech. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
12 Id.; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
13 Even in the most peaceful of child custody arrangements, visitation rights frequently convert the
relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent into a series of strained and superficial
meetings. The child has little exposure to that parent's life-style and view of the world. A deep personal rela-
tionship is often easier for the child to achieve with a stranger-turned-friend than with the parent. Even the
most caring parent can eventually find it less painful and less futile to decrease or terminate the visits.
Miller, Jint Custody, 13 FAM. L. Q. 345, 356 (1979).
14 Smith v. Smith, 9 Utah 2d 157, 159, 340 P.2d 419, 421 (1959).
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new faith may even contribute to the marriage's breakup. 15 Since religious con-
versions are increasing in the United States,1 6 religiously motivated child
custody litigation is likely to increase.
III. Parental Authority Over the
Religious Upbringing of Children
The religious upbringing of children is generally left to the parents' discre-
tion as long as the family is intact. 7 Upon the family's dissolution, however,
the parent awarded custody of the children retains the right to control their
religious training unless the custodial order specifies otherwise. 18
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that parents have
a fundamental interest in guiding their children's religious lives. 19 Parental
control over child rearing, religious or secular, is a liberty of parenthood pro-
tected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 20
This parental autonomy precludes a state's attempt to standardize its citizens
by regimenting the ethical, political, and religious values imparted to youth.2 1
Although political philosophers have occasionally prescribed state control as a
means of perfecting society, 22 the Supreme Court has rejected this proposal as
incompatible with the American notion of liberty. 23
The state, however, possesses power under the parens patriae doctrine24
to intervene in family affairs if parental action or inaction threatens the child's
health and welfare.2 5 The most vivid example of state interest in a child's
religious upbringing arises when the parents' religious beliefs prohibit blood
transfusions. In such situations the state may order a hospital to administer
blood transfusions to a critically ill child despite the parents' objections.2 6 In
Prince v. Massachusetts, 27 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
state can override parental decisions concerning a child's religious training in
15 See, e.g., Morris v. Morris,-Pa. Super. Ct.-,412 A.2d 139 (1979); Commonwealth ex ret. Derr v.
Derr, 148 Pa. Super. Ct. 511, 25 A.2d 769, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942).
16 P. BERGER, B. BERGER & H. KELLNER, THE HOMELESS MIND 77 (1973).
17 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18 See, e.g., Pardue v. Pardue, 285 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1973); In re Guardianship of Faust, 123 So. 2d
218 (Miss. 1960); Esposito v. Esposito, 41 NJ. 143, 195 A.2d 295 (1963); Mester v. Mester, 58 Misc. 2d
790, 296 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Commonwealth exrel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct.
403, 205 A.2d 49 (1965); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 408(a).
19 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
20 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
21 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1923). It has been argued that society as a whole also has an interest in the diversity and pluralism which
may be engendered by minimizing the state's role in the upbringing of children. See Note, Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1353 (1980).
22 See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 460C-D; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02.
23 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
24 As parens patriae (literally "father of the country") the state is protector and guardian of all persons
under a legal disability to act for themselves. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d
Cir. 1971). The growing legal recognition of the fundamental rights of children has diminished the need for
this doctrine. "The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of
juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
25 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
26 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964); In reClark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ct. C.P. 1962); Jehovah's Witnesses
v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'dper curiam 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
27 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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order to protect the child. 28 In Prince, a guardian was convicted by a
Massachusetts court of violating the state's child labor law by permitting her
nine-year-old ward to assist in disseminating religious literature on the street.
Both the parent and the child considered this activity a religious duty with eter-
nal consequences. 29 In upholding the conviction, the Court recognized the
state's interest in sheltering children from activities "wholly inappropriate for
children, especially of tender years. o30 In so holding, the Court emphasized
the potential for emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury in-
herent in such activity. 3' Thus, parents are free to instruct their children in
religious doctrine and observance, but the state will not allow parents "to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age. . . when they can
make that choice themselves." 3 2
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 33 however, the Court narrowed the scope of
allowable state intervention recognized in Prince. In Yoder, Amish parents' right
to keep their children out of high school prevailed over the state's interest in
compulsory education of children.3 4 Amish parents instruct their teen-age
children in skills needed to perform the adult role of farmer or housewife.
Through such training, they impart to their children attitudes favoring manual
work and self-reliance, values cherished under the Amish religion. Amish
children thus spend their teen-age years in the Amish agricultural community
rather than in high school classrooms, which the Amish consider permeated by
"worldly" influences.3 5
Had the Yoder Court more strictly applied the Prince holding, the Amish
parents might have been compelled to send their children to school until the
children were old enough to choose the Amish way of life for themselves.3 6
Arguably, the Amish parents "make martyrs" of their children by causing
them to spend their childhood in an enclave of simplicity within a
technologically complex world. The Court, however, declined to extend Prince
to a situation in which the state could not demonstrate some harm to the
physical or mental health of the child justifying state intervention.3 7
Yoder insulates parental child-rearing decisions from state contravention in
a further respect. The Court observed that when the parents' liberty interest is
combined with a first amendment free exercise claim, "more than merely a
'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competence of the State' is re-
quired to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First
Amendment. "38
28 Id. at 168-69.
29 Id. at 163.
30 Id. at 170.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34 Id. at 234.
35 Id. at 211-12.
36 Id. at 229; Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in andfor Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 118,
121 (Summer 1975).
37 406 U.S. at 230. Justice White, concurring with the majority in Yoder, noted that the state had not
demonstrated that an Amish child could not go on to pursue a higher education or a more technical or ar-
tistic career after he had reached an age of sufficient maturity to leave the sect on his own, as large numbers
of Amish youth did each year. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 233. Some courts have recognized a "fundamental right to family integrity." See, e.g.,
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1977); Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 261-62
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IV. Religious Factors in Child Custody Determinations
Prince involved a guardian and her ward, while Yoder involved a conflict
between state and parental interests in the setting of the nuclear family. When
divorce dissolves a marriage, some courts find state intervention in child-
rearing decisions more easily justified than when the family remains intact.3 9
Some commentators suggest that even a de facto breakdown in the parent-child
relationship may sufficiently undermine parental authority to invite state in-
volvement in parent-child disputes.4 0 Yet the reasons for presuming that
divorce gives the state a greater right to become party to later decisions affect-
ing children's religious upbringing have never been clearly articulated.
Although the state is involved at the time of the divorce, its involvement is
limited to dissolving the marriage and granting custody. The interests served
by protecting parental autonomy over religious upbringing decisions in healthy
marriages would be equally served by protecting that autonomy in single-
parent families. 41 It is not clear whether a disagreement between estranged
parents over their children's religious experience requires judicial supervision,
any more than would a similar dispute between parents whose marriage is
healthy, yet religiously mixed.
A. The Grant of Custody
Child custody contests necessitate state mediation to determine which
parent will be chiefly responsible for raising the child. A court order usually
places the child in the custody of one parent. That parent ordinarily inherits
authority over the child's religious upbringing, authority which had been
previously shared by both parents.4 2
(S.D. Fla. 1977); Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190-91 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds sub noma. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D.
Ala. 1976); Alsagerv. Dist. Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'dpercuriam, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976); Note, supra note 21 at 1235-38. This theory would subject state intervention to strict
scrutiny. The state would be required to meet the rigorous standard of demonstrating a compelling state in-
terest to justify its acts on behalf of the minor children.
Whatever Yoder may mean for parents who object to the state's use of its police power to override their
religious decisions, it may not apply to situations in which the children's interests are not identical to those
of their parents. 406 U.S. 205, 231. In disputes between the parents over a child's religious upbringing, the
state is always seeking what it views as the child's best interests in conflict with the interests of at least one of
the parents.
39 See, e.g., Morris v. Morris,-Pa. Super. Ct.-,412 A.2d 139 (1979).
40 Professor Laurence H. Tribe, for example, has written:
If governmental action on the child's behalf would seriously disrupt the on-going internal pro-
cesses of a basically harmonious family unit, one may well conclude that government should not
intervene.... Thus, routine cases of parental discipline in an essentially successful family whose
continuation is mutually desired will properly be treated as raising no real constitutional issue
even when the state extends various forms of incidental support to parental authority .... But
when a family is in disintegration or at the threshold of collapse-as when an adolescent per-
sistently seeks complete emancipation and is willing, in return, to relieve his or her parents of
reciprocal obligations-then it seems wrong to exonerate the state of responsibility for such coer-
cive parental measures as it permits even by its inaction .... [Tlhe values of family association
and integrity cannot automaticalty override the constitutional personhood of the child who seeks
persistently full autonomy . . . . (emphasis in original).
Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 8, 12 n.13 (Summer 1975).
41 See note 21 supra and text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. The definition of "family" may be broad
enough to include a single divorced parent living with one or more children. See Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion).
42 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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American courts initially viewed the father as holding a natural right to
the custody of his children. 43 Eventually, however, the courts developed a
heavy presumption in favor of the mother as custodian. 44 During this shift in
preference, the courts assumed the role of guardians of the child's best interests
and developed the "best interests" standard for resolving custodial disputes. 45
Critics insist the standard is so inconsistently applied that it is no more than "a
cloak for judicial discretion and intuition. "46
Today, state statutes generally declare that neither father nor mother is to
be preferred in awarding child custody.4 7 In addition, many state statutes
codify the factors to be examined under the "best interests" standard.4 8 Some
courts include the child's religious needs as a factor to be considered under this
standard . 9
The first amendment establishment clause prevents courts from ruling
against a parent solely on the basis of the eccentricity of that parent's religious
beliefs. 50 A court may, however, determine that a child's religious needs re-
quire it to decide which parent might better be able to serve those needs.5 1
Courts may not presume that a child has religious needs but may ascertain
their authenticity by inquiring into whether the child's religious formation has
progressed to the point that the child is "attached" to either parent's particular
creed. 52 Even then, in awarding custody, courts rarely permit religious factors
to outweigh the child's temporal needs. 53
Since the parent obtaining custody is generally given broad discretion over
decisions concerning the child's religious upbringing, the court's award of
custody may seal the child's spiritual future. And since the trial judge's deci-
sion will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse, a judge might draft
his custody order to promote one belief over another and hide his motivation
within the wide discretion afforded him by the imprecision of the "best in-
terests" standard.
Occasionally a parent attempts to insert a provision into the custody order
specifying the type of religious instruction his child is to receive. For example,
an order might condition the custody award upon the custodial parent's raising
her child in a named denomination. 54 Or the custodial parent might be re-
quired to take her child to religious classes or to church.5 5 If the custodial
parent fails to meet the conditions specified by the order, the other parent
43 Miller, supra note 12 at 351-53.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 354.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 353-54.
48 Id.
49 Note, Religion-A Factor in Awarding Custody of Infants?, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 313, 314 (1958). See, e.g.,
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
50 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES S 17.4 at 588-90 (1968). See,
e.g., Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980).
51 Note, supra note 21 at 1339.
52 Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 NJ. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (C.h. Div. 1958).
53 See, e.g., Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill. App. 2d 16, 167 N.E.2d 577 (1960); Quinn v. Franzman, 451
S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1970); T. v. H., 102 NJ. Super. 38, 245 A.2d 221 (Ch. Div. 1968), aff'd, 110 NJ. Super.
8, 264 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Bendrick v. White, 403 Pa. 55, 169 A.2d 69
(1961).
54 See, e.g., Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
55 See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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might petition the court to review its decision and transfer custody to him. 56
The court might be asked to appoint a co-guardian to insure that the child
receives the desired religious upbringing. 57 A petition might even request that
the custodial parent be cited for contempt of court if she fails to comply with the
order.5 8
In the past, contractual agreements between divorced parents were
another means of limiting the custodial parent's discretion over her child's
religious training. 9 Such contracts were frequently used in marriages in which
only one spouse was a Roman Catholic, since the Catholic Church requires the
non-Catholic spouse to agree to raise as Catholics any children born to the
marriage.60 However, the courts have refused to enforce these contracts. 61
Since monetary damages resulting from their breach are largely unprovable,
plaintiffs must seek specific performance. It is impossible, however, for courts
to supervise the religious training which children receive within the home. 62
Furthermore, such contracts restrict the right of one party to the free exercise of
religion. 63 A court could no more order specific performance of such an agree-
ment than it could enforce a racially restrictive covenant. 64 Court enforcement
of religious provisions in a custody order might also constitute an impermissi-
ble state action promoting the establishment of religion.
B. Removal From Custody
A custodial parent's religious behavior may warrant reexamination of that
parent's fitness to care for and nurture her child. 65 No violence is done to the
first amendment when a court determines that certain parental practices
amount to child neglect. For example, if a custodial parent's sectarian activities
consume so great a share of her time that she is unable to care for her child
properly, a court may transfer custody to the non-custodial parent without in-
quiring into the beliefs of the sect. 66 However, the court must not evaluate the
worthiness of the religious doctrine motivating the custodial parent, but must
instead concern itself solely with the child's well-being. That well-being is en-
dangered no less in this case than if the parent devoted an inordinate amount of
time to a political party, athletic league, or charitable group. 67 There is thus no
danger that a court would prefer a particular creed or punish the adherent of an
unpopular faith.
The free exercise clause of the first amendment does not protect the im-
56 See, e.g., In re Crickard, 52 Misc. 63, 102 N.Y.S. 440 (Sur. Ct. 1906).
57 See, e.g., People ex rel. Rich v. Lackey, 131 Misc. 42, 248 N.Y.S. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
58 See, e.g., Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
59 See Smith, Contracts for Religious Education of Children, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 534 (1958).
60 Id. at 535.
61 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
62 Smith, supra note 58 at 538.
63 Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L.R. 333, 363-64 (1955).
64 Id.
65 Excessive corporal punishment of children, parental drug abuse, alcoholism, or abandonment are
specific forms of behavior which a court could classify as child neglect. Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights
of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446 (1976).
66 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Derr v. Derr, 148 Pa. Super. Ct. 511, 24 A.2d 769, cert. denied, 317
U.S. 631 (1942).
67 Ripley v. Ripley, No. A1966 (Tex. Civ. App., Mar. 7, 1979).
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plementation of every belief.68 The state's interest in the welfare of a child of
divorced parents will, therefore, permit state intrusion into religious decisions
harmful to the child. 69 The difficulty lies in drawing the line between harmful
acts and the religion capable of inspiring harmful acts. A Mississippi case, Har-
ris v. Harris,70 provides a colorful illustration of the delicate tailoring of some
custody orders needed to safeguard the child and maintain the custodian's first
amendment rights. The Harris court order prevented the mother, a member of
a snake-handling religious sect, from taking her child to any place where snakes
were handled. 71 However, the order allowed the mother to instruct her child in
her faith and to take the child to a particular church's services at which snakes
were kept in a locked cage. 72
Limiting religiously motivated transfers of child custody to situations pos-
ing an actual danger to the child's welfare serves the societal interest in main-
taining family autonomy over the upbringing of children. 73 It also fosters the
stability of the children's new home, a major psychological benefit for children
shaken by the breakup of their family. 74 One judge has noted, however, that
this policy also renders courts powerless to prevent followers of deranged
religious leaders from taking their children out of the country as a demonstra-
tion of their religious beliefs, as did members of Jim Jones' tragic Jonestown
colony in Guyana. 75 But this criticism overlooks the fact that the potential
harm which may result from affiliation with a particular religion is not confined
to members of divorced families. What would begin as a well-intentioned effort
to protect children living in broken homes from the potentially harmful
religious practices of custodial parents could end in adoption of judicial stan-
dards for orthodox child raising for all families. 76
V. Visitation Conflicts Affecting Children's Religious Training
A divorce decree usually grants visitation privileges to the non-custodial
parent unless he is found to be unfit.7 7 Where religious principles are strong
and compromise is unachievable, the non-custodial parent may attempt to in-
fluence his children's religious values during visitation without the consent of
the other parent. In addition, he may time his visits to frustrate the custodian's
plans for the children's worship or religious education. Several courts have
ruled on visitation issues affecting the custodial parent's autonomy in control-
ling her children's religious training. 78
68 "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose ... the child ... to ill health
or death." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1879).
69 See text accompanying notes 24-38 supra.
70 343 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1977).
71 Id. at 764.
72 Id.
73 See note 21 and text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
74 Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminac, 39 LAw & CONTEMP.
Paoe. 226, 264-65 (Summer 1975).
75 Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 602 P.2d 1279, 1291 (1979) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting).
76 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
77 CLARK, supra note 50, § 17.4 at 590.
78 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Heriford, 586 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. App. 1979); Chasan v.
Mintz,-N.H.-,409 A.2d 787 (1979); Wagner v. Wagner, 165 N.J. Super. 553, 398 A.2d 918 (App. Div.
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A. The Right of Parental Visitation
The "visitation right" is not universally considered a legal right. 79 Some
courts have held that the non-custodial parent's right to visit his child may be
denied only in the most extreme cases.80 These courts have allowed visitation
rights even to parents who engaged in marital misconduct 8' or failed to support
their children.8 2 Other courts view visitation privileges as existing only to pro-
mote the "best interests" of the child.8 3 These courts consider visitation
primarily a right of the child and secondarily a right of the non-custodial
parent. 84
In Wagner v. Wagner,8 5 the father asserted that his parental right of visita-
tion was infringed upon by his former wife's choice of religious instruction for
their children. Wagner provides a good example of the manner in which the tim-
ing of the usual weekend visitation can frustrate the custodial parent's direction
.of her children's usual weekend religious activities.
The parents in Wagner appeared to be free of religious hostility, since both
approved of their children's attending Hebrew school.86 The court order pro-
vided for the father's visitation on alternate weekends. Visitation began on Fri-
day evenings if the Hebrew school did not meet Saturday. 7 When Hebrew
school met, however, the visitation period began after the last class ending at
12:30 Saturday afternoon.8 8 This arrangement continued until the school
began requiring the children to attend every weekend.
89
The New Jersey intermediate appellate court favored the father's visita-
tion right over the custodial parent's right to determine the appropriate type of
religious education for the children. The court regarded the father's visitation
right not as a right per se, but as a factor to be considered in determining the
children's best interests. 90 However, the court also disregarded the custodial
parent's interest in providing her children with the religious training of her
choice. The court reduced this parental right to the status of a mere factor to be
considered in determining the children's best interests. 9 1 In the court's view
this right was not even equal to the visitation privilege. According to the court,
the custodial parent's right to determine her children's religious education was
secondary to the "advantages of continuous contact, love and affection be-
tween children and ... the parent not having custody." 92 The court remanded
with the following instruction:
1979); Morris v. Morris,-Pa. Super. Ct.-,412 A.2d 139 (1979); Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978).
79 Henszey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What Is the "Best Interest" Doctrine?, 15 J. FAM. L. 213,
214 (1976).
80 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 487, 381 A.2d 1311 (1977).
81 See, e.g., Radford v. Matezuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960).
82 See, e.g., Van Zee v. Van Zee, 226 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1975).
83 See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972).
84 Id. at 15.
85 165 NJ. Super. 553, 398 A.2d 918 (App. Div. 1979).
86 Id. at 557.
87 Id. at 554.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 556.





Where there is a conflicting situation, a method of achieving for the children
the benefits of their visitation . . . and of their religious training should be
sought, even at the expense, perhaps, of less than ideal religious instruction.
Any deficiencies in such education may be overcome if the children desire it
when they become more mature. 93
The result reached by the court in Wagner was appropriate, since the
parents in that case might arrive at some arrangement for religious training
that would not so severely curtail the father's visitation rights. However, the
ruling poses a serious threat to the right of custodial parents to order their
children's religious lives. Had the father in Wagner brought his complaint
because of antagonism to his former wife's faith rather than a desire to see his
children, he could have used the guise of concern for familial contact to in-
terfere with the mother's ability to transmit a spiritual heritage to her children.
Protection of the custodial parent's right to control the religious upbring-
ing of her children requires greater deference to that parent's choice of
weekend religious activities. If the weekend plans chosen by the custodial
parent for the children's spiritual development are reasonable in the light of the
alternatives available, the plans should not be altered to make more time
available for visitation periods.
B. Religious Training Provided By the Non-Custodial Parent
If the custodial parent controls her children's religious upbringing, the
non-custodial parent will have no right to determine his children's church ex-
perience. But there may be a residue of constitutionally protected parental
rights which survive dissolution of a marriage. Coupled with rights under the
free exercise clause of the first amendment, these residual rights may allow the
non-custodial parent to convey religious values to his children during visitation
periods. 94 Although the court might deny the non-custodial parent these
residual rights, it could not restrict that parent's religious communications to
his children solely on the basis of the communications' doctrinal content
without violating his first amendment rights. 95
In Stanley v. Illinois96 and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 97 the Supreme Court suggests that biological parents retain an interest
in their children's upbringing regardless of the legal relationship between
parent and parent or between parents and children. In Stanley, the Court held
that a state could not deny an unwed father a hearing on fitness for custody if
the hearing was available to married fathers. 98 In Smith, the Court recognized
that natural parents enjoy some constitutionally protected interests even after
their children have been removed from their care and placed with a foster fami-
ly. 99 By suggesting that some parental rights exist by virtue of biology rather
93 Id.
94 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
95 See notes 11, 12, 23, and 38 supra and text accompanying note 38 supra.
96 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
97 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
98 405 U.S. at 658.
99 431 U.S. at 847. In Smith the Court recognized that the foster family was entitled to a liberty interest
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than marital status, Stanley and Smith imply that dissolution of the marriage
may not extinguish all parental rights of the non-custodial parent.
In Morris v. Morris, °00 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ordered a
Jehovah's Witness to stop taking his four-year-old daughter on door-to-door
missionary activities during weekend visitations.'10 The girl's Roman Catholic
mother had submitted psychiatric testimonial evidence that the child's ex-
posure to two inconsistent religions could ultimately result in her disregarding
the teaching of either parent. 102 The father, who considered missionary work
vital to his daughter's salvation, argued on appeal that the court's order
restricted his constitutional rights of privacy and free exercise of religion.103
In Pennsylvania, visitation is considered the parent's rather than the
child's right.10 4 Like the Wagner court, the Morris court viewed as competing
but coequal the non-custodial parent's visitation right and the custodial
parent's religious upbringing right. Unlike the Wagner court, however, the
Morris court sided with the custodial parent, extending her authority over the
child to include control over the child's religious activities during visitation.
The inconsistency between Wagner and Morris demonstrates the confusion
surrounding the rights of divorced parents to control the religious upbringing
of their children. This uncertainty increases the likelihood that courts will per-
mit non-custodial parents to interfere with custodial parents' choice of their
children's weekend religious education and worship, yet refuse to permit non-
custodial parents to communicate religious values to their children during
visitation.
The courts of the state of Washington have struck down orders prohibiting
a non-custodial parent from taking his children to services of a denomination
other than that of the custodial parent. 105 In Munoz v. Munoz'0 6 and Robertson v.
Robertson,'0 7 Washington courts refused to interfere with the religious training
provided by either parent in the absence of a clear and affirmative showing that
the conflicting religious beliefs affected the child's general welfare.108 The
courts stated that factual evidence of harm to the child was required, rather
than "mere conclusions and speculations.'" 0 9
Morris differs from Munoz and Robertson in that the door-to-door activities
of the non-custodial parent in Morris more nearly resembled the
"martyr-like"proselytizing held to justify state intervention in Prince v.
in family privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. The foster family was not "a mere collection of
unrelated individuals." Id. at 844. This interest had to defer to the state, however, when the purpose of the
state intervention was to return the child to the natural parents. Id. at 847. The Court recognized that Smith
raised complex and novel questions about the respective rights of the foster parents as against those rights
remaining in the natural parents. Id. Since Smith was decided on narrow grounds, these complex questions
are still unanswered. Their resolution could clarify the degree to which a non-custodial parent retains a pro-
tected interest in communicating religious values to his or her child.
100 -Pa. Super. Ct.-,412 A.2d 139 (1979).
101 Id.
102 Id., 412 A.2d at 146.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 147 n.5.
105 Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971); Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash. App.
425, 575 P.2d 1092 (1978).
106 79 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971).
107 19 Wash. App. 425, 575 P.2d 1092 (1978).
108 Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d at 810, 489 P.2d at 1135; Robertson v. Robertson, 575 P.2d at 1093.
109 Robertson v. Robertson, Id.
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Massachusetts. 0 Although the Morris court preserved the non-custodial parent's
right to discuss his religious beliefs with his child,"' it also reserved the power
to supervise those discussions upon a demonstration of potential psychological
harm to the child from exposure to disparate creeds.1 1 2 The Morris court thus
moved a long way toward establishing conflicting parental teachings as a
justification for state enforcement of the non-custodial parent's choice regard-
ing the child's religion.
Just as a custodial parent cannot shelter her children from the world of
competing ideas forever, court intervention to accomplish this end would be
equally fruitless. The custodial parent should rely primarily on the strength of
her relationship with the children and her ability to answer the children's ques-
tions. Judicial assistance should be given only when the custodial parent is
unable to prevent her children's involvement in "martyr-like" practices such
as the street evangelism condemned in Prince. " 3
VI. The Child's Right to Choose His Own Religion
The complex competition between the interests of the state, the custodial
parent, and the non-custodial parent may be further complicated as a result of
the children's rights movement. Once a child is old enough to form some
reasoned judgment regarding his parents' creeds, most courts take the child's
judgment into consideration in awarding custody.' ' 4 However, many ad-
vocates of children's rights contend that judicial consideration of the child's
desires is inadequate. They argue that as a person under the law, a child
possesses many fundamental rights and is entitled to legal protection whenever
those rights are abridged or threatened." 5
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized various constitu-
tional rights of children in cases juxtaposing children's rights against the states'
interests." 6 The Court has not found children's constitutional rights to equal
those of adults, due to the peculiar vulnerability of children, their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the importance of
the parent's role in their upbringing."17 The Court has not yet faced a case pit-
ting an asserted right of a child against the authority of one or both parents.
However, Justice Douglas did address the issue in his dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 1 8 Justice Douglas would have permitted the state in that case to super-
vise educational decisions of Amish parents whose children valued education
over the parents' religion." 9 According to Justice Douglas, the Amish child
110 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
111 412 A.2d at 147.
112 "[W]e cannot accept an argument that the absence of present harm constricts the state's power to
act. Were this the case, we would have to allow the psychological harm.., to progress to a mentally crip-
pling point before action could be taken." Id. at 146.
113 See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
114 See, e.g., Vanover v. Hunley, 309 Ky. 461, 218 S.W.2d 20 (1949); Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48
N.J. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (Ch. Div. 1958).
115 Foster and Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 343-47 (1972).
116 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1971); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
117 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
118 406 U.S. 205.
119 Id. at 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he
will have to break from the Amish tradition."'2 0
According to some commentators, children's rights can be best viewed
when separated into rights of protection and rights of choice.' 2' Children's
rights of protection would include the right not to be incarcerated without due
process, the right to own property, and the right to physical protection. 122 Con-
ceivably, the courts could enforce rights of protection even where parents at-
tempt to obstruct those rights. Children's rights of choice, on the other hand,
would include the right to make decisions regarding religion, education, mar-
riage, or the use of alcoholic beverages. 123 Parental authority over these rights,
which only develop in unemancipated children with the development of their
capacity for making reasoned, informed choices, could be maintained free from
judicial interference. In any event, children's rights of choice could not be
asserted over a parent's objection absent a showing of danger to the child's
welfare. Thus, distinguishing rights of protection from rights of choice would
preserve a parent's authority to direct children's religious upbringing in family
settings and in child custody disputes.
Moves toward recognizing children's rights of choice have been made,
however, in two Supreme Court abortion decisions, Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth 24 and Bellotti v. Baird. 125 Danforth struck down a Missouri
statute requiring unmarried minors to obtain parental consent before procur-
ing abortions. 1 26 Bellotti struck down a Massachusetts statute requiring that a
minor's parents be notified as part of a procedure for obtaining an abortion.1 27
Although Belloti elsewhere supports broad parental discretion in child
rearing, 1 28 both Bellotti and Danforth consider a minor's decision to abort her
child different in important aspects from other decisions that may be made dur-
ing minority."29 A decision to abort cannot be postponed like a decision on the
education of an Amish child.130 Moreover, a parental veto over a daughter's
abortion has serious social and economic consequences for the daughter and
may force her to accept adult responsibilities at an early age. 13 Nonetheless,
Bellotti and Danforth are difficult to harmonize with Wisconsin v. Yoder:"32 the
former cases give a child the right to make independent decisions regarding
120 See note 37 supra.
121 Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their
"Rights, " 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 644-50; Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and
the State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 320, 321 (1970).
122 Hafen, supra at 644.
123 See note 119, supra.
124 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
125 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
126 428 U.S. at 74. In Danforth, the Court characterized the Missouri statute's codification of parental
power over a child's decision on this subject so fraught with moral and religious overtones as unconstitu-
tionally granting "a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician
and his patient." Id.
127 443 U.S. at 643, 651.
128 Id. at 638.
129 Id. at 642-43, 650.
130 Id. at 642.
131 Id.
132 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The unmarried pregnant daughter envisioned in Belotti orDanforth may put her
child up for adoption, or leave him with the grandparents who prevented her from aborting him. She will
then find it much easier to pursue an adult life-style of her own choosing than will an Amish child who
desires to develop a talent in music or the arts.
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reproductive issues, while the latter case gives parents the right to control
development of the child's mind.
The strength of a child's right to make decisions based on his own rather
than his parents' religious beliefs may first be tested in a child custody situa-
tion, since courts seem more willing to make decisions affecting children's
religious upbringing after the marriage has been dissolved. 133 The custodial
parent's right to determine her child's religion could be defeated especially if
the non-custodial parent supports the child's choice. Viewed against the
backdrop of the movement for greater recognition of "children's rights," child
custody decisions which erode the custodian's ability to determine her child's
religious training may affect parents' roles in the nuclear family as well.
VII. Conclusion
As child psychiatry devotes more attention to the maze of problems con-
fronting children of divorced parents, the law should establish principles to
provide these children with maximum access to both their parents. 13 4 There is a
general consensus among psychiatrists and lawyers that child custody contests
"rebound inevitably to the future, and perhaps permanent, disadvantage of
the child."' 35 When a second dispute centering on religious differences arises
after the decree of custody, the child must not only endure another round of
potentially scarring conflict, but must suffer an assault upon the faith which
may be the most stabilizing influence in his life.
The tensions arising from these disputes can best be minimized by placing
the power to choose religious training for the child firmly in the hands of the
custodial parent. Courts should not dislodge that power unless such action is
necessary to prevent actual or imminent damage to the child's health or safety.
The secure vesting in the custodial parent of authority over religious mat-
ters requires placing that parent's interest in the child's church or religious
class attendance above the non-custodial parent's interest in visitation. Such a
course of action, however, does not require complete elimination of the visiting
parent's rights in religious matters. A visiting parent should be allowed to com-
municate his religious attitudes to his child. Of course, should the visiting
parent attempt to instill in his child hatred for the custodial parent's creed, the
court might deem that parent "unfit" and deny visitation rights altogether.
Although it cannot distinguish between the various religions, a court can detect
and prevent a parent's attempt to poison his child's relationship with his other
parent.
By providing the custodial parent with strong support, the law will help
spare the child further traumatic court confrontations. Further, state interven-
tion on behalf of religion will be avoided and conscientious non-custodial
parents will be free to influence the development of their children's values
through channels raising less potential for conflict and requiring less court
supervision.
Steven M. Zarowny
133 See note 39 supra.
134 Miller, note 13 supra at 347-51.
135 Id. at 350.
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